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	<title>vlogolution network &#187; HFTs</title>
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		<title>$IBKR Interactive Brokers CEO having second thoughts about HFTs</title>
		<link>http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/2011-10-20-ibkr-interactive-brokers-ceo-having-second-thoughts-about-hfts/</link>
		<comments>http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/2011-10-20-ibkr-interactive-brokers-ceo-having-second-thoughts-about-hfts/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Oct 2011 19:13:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexander P Morris]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[moMoney]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PassMeThePork]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vlogolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HFTs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-frequency trading]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ibkr]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[interactive brokers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[thomas peterffy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Timber Hill LLC]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/?p=1153</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[(WSJ) While a number of Wall Street traders would agree, this argument may seem surprising coming from the 67-year-old Mr. Petterfy: He is widely considered the father of computer trading, a position that has made him a billionaire several times over.  High-frequency traders are &#8220;fair-weather market makers,&#8221; he said in an interview. &#8220;When the markets [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/2011-10-20-ibkr-interactive-brokers-ceo-having-second-thoughts-about-hfts/" target="_new" title="View Full Post and Related Links!"><img src="http://www.vlogolution.com/vthumbs/thumb-hft.png" title="View Full Post and Related Links!" align="left" width="100" height="60" border=0><img src="http://www.vlogolution.com/images/spacer.gif" align="left" width="10" height="60" border=0></a><div id="_mcePaste">(WSJ) While a number of Wall Street traders would agree, this argument may seem surprising coming from the 67-year-old Mr. Petterfy: He is widely considered the father of computer trading, a position that has made him a billionaire several times over.  High-frequency traders are &#8220;fair-weather market makers,&#8221; he said in an interview. &#8220;When the markets came under serious stress , we felt like we were standing on the precipice by ourselves, staring into the abyss.&#8221;  <strong>Mr. Peterffy has a solution: Require exchanges to hold orders for one-tenth of a second, while allowing registered market makers, such as Interactive, to trade at will.</strong> The requirement could put a dent in many high-frequency strategies, which rely on the ability to get in and out of positions as speeds measured in microseconds, or one-millionth of a second&#8230;</div>
<p></p>
<div>Full Story: <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203752604576641293119362426.html" target="_blank" title="A Call to Pull Reins on Rapid-Fire Trade">A Call to Pull Reins on Rapid-Fire Trade (WSJ)</a></div>
<p></p>
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		<title>The Perfect Storm: Lessons Learned from the DOW’s 1000 Point Flash Crash</title>
		<link>http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/2010-05-19-the-perfect-storm-lessons-learned-from-the-dow%e2%80%99s-1000-point-flash-crash/</link>
		<comments>http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/2010-05-19-the-perfect-storm-lessons-learned-from-the-dow%e2%80%99s-1000-point-flash-crash/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:02:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexander P Morris]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[moMoney]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PassMeThePork]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alternative trading systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[circuit-breakers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collapse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ECNs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[falling knife]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fat finger]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[flash crash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HFTs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-frequency trading]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[leverage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[liquidity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[liquidity crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[market crash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[market panic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[melt-down]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[melt-up]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nasd:itmn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nasd:tivo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nyse:pg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[perfect storm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[short-sellers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[slippage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stock market]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trading halts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transaction tax]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/?p=622</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Was the May 6th, 2010 intraday crash and recovery just another one of those once-in-a-lifetime rare anomalies -– a rare confluence of events coming together to form the “Perfect Storm”?  And if a “Perfect Storm” generally occurs so infrequently, why does it seem that we are presented with a newsworthy “Perfect Storm” in the markets [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/2010-05-19-the-perfect-storm-lessons-learned-from-the-dow%e2%80%99s-1000-point-flash-crash/" target="_new" title="View Full Post and Related Links!"><img src="http://www.vlogolution.com/vthumbs/pp20100519-00.jpg" title="View Full Post and Related Links!" align="left" width="240" height="180" border=0><img src="http://www.vlogolution.com/images/spacer.gif" align="left" width="10" height="180" border=0></a><p>Was the May 6<sup>th</sup>, 2010 intraday crash and recovery just another one of those once-in-a-lifetime rare anomalies -– a rare confluence of events coming together to form the “Perfect Storm”?  And if a “Perfect Storm” generally occurs so infrequently, why does it seem that we are presented with a newsworthy “Perfect Storm” in the markets on an almost regular basis?  With all the misinformation and outrageous reasons the media and its “pundits” offer, perhaps it’s time to revisit exactly how markets work, and what (or who) may be to blame.  It’s a lot easier to blame a “fat finger” or some naughty short-sellers for a huge market-selloff, than to accept that markets do not always have a buyer for every seller.  Very simply, when a large number of market participants decide they all must sell (or buy) at the exact same time, an “air pocket” of price action will form.  Anyone who has traded a market knows that this type of single-sided liquidity “crisis” occurs every day in the markets to various extents, especially after significant news events are released.  While these relatively smaller moves may not be nearly as significant as a 1000 point intraday drop and overall market selloff, the dynamics are more or less the same.  The setup develops with a large number of market participants all thinking the same way (ie. very strong bullish or bearish sentiment), generally due to a strong extended trend in a market.  When the market finally turns, the large group of participants on the wrong side of the trade all decide to reverse course at the same time, at similar stop levels, just to save their leveraged hides.  Does the trading term “slippage” ring a bell?</p>
<p><img src="http://www.vlogolution.com/images/$indu-20100506-1000pt-crash-day-daily.gif" alt="5/6/2010 $indu flash crash day daily" width="510" /></p>
<p><a href="http://www.vlogolution.com/hot/2010-05-19-the-perfect-storm-lessons-learned-from-the-dow%e2%80%99s-1000-point-flash-crash/" target="_new" title="View Complete Post and Related Links!">(read more...)</a>]]></content:encoded>
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